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This article investigates the effect of workplace unionization and
product market volatility on firms’ propensity to use temporary
employment. Using Italian firm-level data, the authors show that
volatility has a positive impact on the share of temporary contracts.
The baseline estimates for the impact of unions are inconclusive,
but a clear pattern emerges when a specification including an inter-
action term with volatility is used. This approach allows a richer
characterization of the impact of workplace unionization, which is
positive for low levels of volatility and negative for high levels. The
authors discuss various direct and indirect mechanisms to explain
this novel finding. Furthermore, they find that these effects hold
only for cases in which the employer does not provide training for
temporary workers, whereas temporary contracts with training provi-
sions are not affected by unions, volatility, and their interplay.
In the past few decades, most European countries have enacted a series oflabor market reforms designed to endow firms with enhanced contrac-
tual flexibility in the face of the increasing economic uncertainty related to
globalization and technological change. These reforms have generally been
introduced ‘‘at the margin,’’ facilitating the use of temporary contracts for
new hires while leaving employment protection for open-ended contracts
unaffected, ultimately producing dual labor markets in which temporary
workers might be entrapped in ‘‘low-quality’’ jobs (Boeri 2012). For this rea-
son, economists and policymakers are showing increased interest in identify-
ing the determinants of temporary employment. Most of the literature has
generally focused on labor supply dynamics, typically using individual data
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from household and labor force surveys (e.g., Booth, Francesconi, and
Frank 2002). The firms’ demand for temporary workers has been studied
rather less, despite its considerable importance, as highlighted by the empiri-
cal evidence showing that fixed-term contracts are typically favored more by
firms than by workers (e.g., Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano 2004).
Apart from the focus on the difference in firing costs between open-end
and temporary contracts (e.g., Kahn 2007; Boeri and Garibaldi 2007), the
literature on the demand for temporary employment by firms has investi-
gated two additional issues. The first one concerns the role of unions, which
are of primary relevance in understanding the employment dynamics in
European labor markets. An under-explored issue, which lies at the heart of
this article, is whether the pervasive presence of unions and collective bar-
gaining at the firm level may have contributed to the diffusion of temporary
employment, partly as a way to maximize the utility of the ‘‘insider’’ workers
(e.g., permanent and older workers) that the unions mostly represent
(Saint-Paul 1996). So far, the literature has provided ambiguous evidence
on this issue (e.g., Gramm and Schnell 2001; Houseman 2001; Autor 2003;
Salvatori 2012). The second factor that has drawn attention in the literature
analyzing the determinants of the demand for temporary employment con-
cerns the volatility of the economic environment in which firms operate.
Abraham and Taylor (1996) and Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994), among
others, argued that in more volatile environments firms increase the use of
temporary employment, which can be a valuable buffer stock to adjust to
fluctuations. The volatility of the economic environment, however, affects
not only the behavior of the firms but also the behavior of the unions, if
they anticipate the firms’ hiring strategies when demand volatility increases
(Freeman and Medoff 1984; Booth 1995). This issue has been largely
neglected by the literature on temporary employment, despite its impor-
tance in understanding the unions’ role.
To the best of our knowledge, this article is the first that focuses explicitly
on the interplay between workplace unionization and product demand volati-
lity in affecting the firms’ propensity to use temporary employment. We base
our empirical analysis on Italy, a country characterized by a notable increase
in temporary contracts in the past few decades and by a considerable power
of unions in the bargaining process. We rely on a rich firm-level data set, the
Employer and Employee Survey (Rilevazione Longitudinale su Imprese e
Lavoro [RIL]), conducted by the Institute for the Development of Workers’
Professional Training (ISFOL) in 2005 and 2007. We supplement the RIL
data with balance-sheet information from the AIDA database by Bureau van
Dijk, which refers to incorporated firms in the nonfinancial private sector.
Our preferred econometric specification regresses the share of tempo-
rary workers on union presence, demand volatility, and their interaction,
after controlling for an ample set of firm and labor force covariates. We
deal with the potential endogeneity of workplace unionization in the con-
text of Italian industrial relations, which resemble the institutional
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framework of other countries of continental Europe. We also discuss various
channels that may explain the emergence of both a positive and a negative
interaction term between volatility and union.
The issues investigated in this article are of interest along at least two
dimensions. First, our investigation can enhance understanding the beha-
vior of unions in influencing the use of temporary contracts. We shed light
on the fact that unions’ behavior can actually be different according to local
and industry market conditions, that is, volatility.
Second, the finding of some unexplored unions’ behavioral subtleties has
relevance from a policy point of view. A lively and important debate on indus-
trial relations is ongoing in Europe. In many countries, the core of industrial
relations takes place at the national-sectoral level, with little room left at the
local and firm level. By focusing on the behavior of unions at the local level, we
contribute to the policy debate about decentralization of the industrial relation.
Another contribution offered by this article lies in the investigation of
whether the effects of union presence and demand volatility on the use of
temporary employment are heterogeneous across different types of tempo-
rary contracts. In particular, we distinguish between fixed-term contracts
without any training clauses and temporary contracts for which a training
clause is expressly introduced by the labor legislation. The difference
between these types of temporary contracts appears crucial for firms’ per-
sonnel strategies, and the contracts have different implications for the
employment prospects and the welfare of workers and hence of unions
(Berton, Devicienti, and Pacelli 2011).
The Related Literature
Temporary contracts have been widely studied in the past few decades.
Attention has been given to the alleged beneficial impacts of unemploy-
ment reduction, especially for young workers (OECD 2008), as well as to
the potential negative effects for the welfare of workers (Blanchard and
Landier 2002; Booth et al. 2002; Boeri 2012) and on labor productivity
(Battisti and Vallanti 2013; Cappellari, Leonardi, and Dell’Aringa 2012;
Damiani, Pompei, and Ricci 2014).
Note that the majority of the applied research on this issue is based on indi-
vidual data that are unlikely to account appropriately for the firms’ incentives to
hire temporary workers. Indeed, the available evidence shows that a substantial
share of temporary employment appears to be involuntary on the part of the
worker (Booth and Francesconi 2003). This result suggests that firms’ character-
istics and personnel policies play a key role in determining the diffusion of tem-
porary contracts. For instance, Caggese and Cun˜at (2008) make use of firm
panel data to show that financially constrained firms use temporary workers
more intensively than do financially unconstrained firms.
More in line with our article, a strand of the literature focuses on the
impact of trade unions at the workplace on the use of temporary
TEMPORARY EMPLOYMENT, DEMAND VOLATILITY, AND UNIONS 3
employment. This literature argues that the impact is potentially ambiguous,
with both direct and indirect mechanisms at work. On the one hand, unions
may directly contribute to a firm’s strategy on labor organization and hiring
policies. This may happen formally, through firm-level specific agreements
with the unions, or informally, through employee consultation and involve-
ment practices. One of the insights from the insider-outsider literature is
that the unions may encourage firms to increase their use of temporary
workers if they regard temporary employment acts as a buffer to isolate per-
manent workers from negative effects of demand uncertainty and technolo-
gical shocks (Bentolila and Dolado 1994; Saint-Paul 1996). The presence of
a union might also influence a firm’s use of temporary workers indirectly,
for example, by inducing firms to increase their share of temporary contracts
to reduce a union-driven rise in labor costs (Abraham and Taylor 1996).
On the other hand, the unions may also oppose the diffusion of temporary
contracts, as temporary workers are typically less unionized and less engaged
in industrial relations, representing a potential threat to union strength and
representativeness (Heery 2004; Salvatori 2012). Unions may also be con-
cerned with an excessive use of fixed-term contracts because of the negative
effects on social welfare and labor market cohesion (Visser 2002).
The empirical evidence for the United States is controversial. Gramm
and Schnell (2001), using a small sample of firms from Alabama, found a
negative correlation between union coverage and the probability of using
temporary employees in the main occupational groups. Houseman (2001)
studied a sample of more than 500 US firms and reached a similar conclu-
sion. Conversely, using aggregate data from the United States, Autor (2003)
found that the spread of temporary employment proved to be faster in
states where the unions declined more slowly.
As for Europe, the empirical research specifically investigating the effects
of unions on firms’ propensity to employ temporary workers is rather scant
and provides mixed results. Francesconi and Garcia-Serrano (2004) found
no evidence of correlation between the share of temporary employment
and unionization, using data on Spanish firms. Salvatori (2012) worked
from British data and found no support for the hypothesis that firms under
the threat of unionization are more likely to use fixed-term workers, and
only weak evidence of negative effects for agency workers.
Of course, industrial relation practices and legislation on the utilization of
fixed-term contracts differ markedly across countries, which might partly
account for the divergent results. Salvatori (2009) provided the first comparative
study by using workplace level data from a number of European countries. In
general, he reported that unionized workplaces are more likely to use tempo-
rary contracts across Europe, and hence the unions contribute to creating labor
market duality and welfare disparities between insider and outsider workers.
A potential caveat of the existing empirical literature is that the impact of
unionization on the firms’ use of temporary contracts is generally examined
without accounting for economic uncertainty. This concern matters for at least
two reasons.
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First, economic fluctuations have long been recognized as an important
determinant of a firm’s choice to hire on a temporary or permanent basis.
For example, Bentolila and Saint-Paul (1994) showed that the difference in
firing costs between permanent and temporary workers in Spain is associ-
ated with a higher cyclical elasticity (to sales) of the demand for temporary
employment. In other words, firms can use temporary workers as a buffer,
dropping them during recessions and allowing for a faster increase of
employment during upturns. Boeri and Garibaldi (2007) found that, in the
short run, Italian firms’ propensity to hire on a temporary basis depends
largely on the state of economic conditions and the business cycle.1
Including a measure of firms’ demand volatility is important to reduce
omitted variable bias when investigating the impact of unionization on the
demand for temporary employment, because output volatility is likely to be
correlated with both the demand for temporary employment and workplace
unionization if insider workers look at the unions to make their jobs safer.
Second, no studies explore the interaction effects between the volatility of
the economic environment and the presence of unions at the workplace. In
particular, product demand volatility is likely to affect objectives and strategies
in the bargaining process between unions and firms over various aspects of
the employment relations. Economic uncertainty may therefore constitute a
relevant dimension of heterogeneity in the impact of unionization on a firm’s
demand for temporary employment, hitherto neglected in the literature.
Our article also contributes to this literature in an additional respect.
Departing from the practice in the existing papers, we investigate whether
heterogeneous impacts of union and demand volatility occur across two
major categories of temporary contracts that characterize most of European
countries (Eurofound 2014; Cedefop 2016), namely those explicitly offering
training to the worker and those for which a training clause is absent. The
difference between these two types of temporary contracts appears crucial
for firms’ personnel strategies and has implications for the employment
prospects and the welfare of workers (Berton et al. 2011).
The Interplay between Unions and Volatility: Possible Explanations
The interplay between unions and volatility is one of the main contributions
of this article. To investigate the interaction term we utilize the same con-
ceptual distinction used to analyze the impact of unions on temporary con-
tracts. Basically, we have in mind two main categories of channels, named
for simplicity ‘‘direct’’ and ‘‘indirect.’’ In the direct channel, the workers’
representatives directly (formally or informally) affect the firms’ choices on
the hiring of temporary and permanent workers. In the indirect channel,
the firm hires more (or less) temporary workers in response to union
1See also Holmlund and Storrie (2002), Costain, Jimeno, and Thomas (2010), and Lotti and Viviano
(2012) for related contributions.
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presence. Although the distinction between the two categories is not always
neat, we believe that classifying the various mechanisms at play has some
pedagogical value.
Broadly speaking, most of the explanations proposed relate to a gen-
eral trade-off faced by unions between a buffer effect (which is potentially
beneficial to the unions’ core members and insiders) and a weaker bar-
gaining position, in turn related to the fact that temporary workers typi-
cally provide lower support to unions. The equilibrium in the bargaining
process with the firm will also depend on how much weight the union
attaches to the objectives of employment stability versus maintaining its
bargaining power and will generate either a positive or a negative interac-
tion term.
We begin by investigating explanations entailing a positive interaction
term. First, a union strongly concerned about employment stability for its
core members (permanent workers) might encourage the firm to hire
even more temporary workers when volatility increases (a direct effect).
In the same direction, given that unions tend to restrict a firm’s internal
flexibility and adaptability (Gramm and Schnell 2001), an increase in
volatility puts additional pressure on the firm’s need to recover flexibility
and to countervail any union-driven rigidity. Hence, a possible strategy
for the firm is to hire more temporary workers (an indirect effect).
Additionally, the firm that needs to recover flexibility in the face of
increased volatility might be tempted to hire temporary workers as a
weapon to undermine the union’s bargaining power and hence its ability
to reduce the internal flexibility and to resist organizational changes, as
suggested by Hatton (2014).
What are the possible mechanisms supporting a negative interaction
term? The starting point is that the union might anticipate a firm’s strategy
concerning the increase in temporary employment when volatility increases.
The unions are also aware that temporary workers might eventually weaken
the unions’ bargaining power, and that firms might in fact deliberately use
flexible work arrangements as a weapon for accelerating such a weakening.
Hence, the union might start opposing an excessive hiring of temporary
workers in the presence of raising volatility, to maintain a higher bargaining
power. This result might be accomplished by means of formal bargaining
between the firm and its workers (a direct effect), as well as through more
informal involvement and consultation practices between the management
and the employees’ representatives.
The unions may also anticipate that, as volatility rises, temporary workers
will be even more likely to leave the firm (because of shorter contracts,
reduced probability of contract renewals, higher turnover), and to engage
even less in union activity or support, which threatens the union’s bargain-
ing power. Also in this case, the unions have incentives to oppose the hiring
of temporary workers as volatility rises. We expect this effect to be stronger
for those temporary workers who are typically employed as a buffer stock
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(e.g., hired with contracts that do not stipulate for firm’s training), which
means they face a lower probability of being transformed into permanent
workers and becoming union members.2
Indirect mechanisms can also give rise to a negative interaction term. For
instance, the unions might opt for a cooperation strategy with the manage-
ment, in response to an increase in the demand for ‘‘insurance’’ by workers
because of higher volatility. This approach may result in wage moderation
by a risk-adverse union, as suggested by the work of Guiso, Pistaferri, and
Schivardi (2005). Moreover, a risk-adverse union might make concessions
in terms of providing the firm with a higher internal employment flexibility,
for example, forms of labor re-organization involving permanent, core
workers. In both cases, these actions may ultimately reduce the firm’s need
to hire temporary workers.
Related indirect mechanisms are also suggested by the literature on
High-Performance Human Resource Management (HRM) and cooperative
industrial relations (Freeman and Medoff 1984). A number of studies sug-
gest that firms may ameliorate their productivity by introducing new HRM
practices, including comprehensive systems and procedures of employee
recruitment and selection, training, incentive compensation and perfor-
mance assessment, grievance and attitude assessment, employee involve-
ment, information sharing, and improved communication (e.g., Bloom
et al. 2014). As suggested in the literature (Black and Lynch 2001; Gill 2009;
Pohler and Luchak 2014), the presence of unions may favor the implemen-
tation of these HRM practices through a variety of channels. For instance,
under uncertainty, agreements made between managers and workers may
not be legally enforceable, so the presence of unions can be of help in
addressing incentive compatibility problems that may arise at the workplace
(Malcomson 1983).3 In other words, in a risky economic environment and
with incomplete contracts, the unions may be able to reduce free-riding
problems by promoting cooperative industrial relations and employees’ par-
ticipation in decision making, a strategy that contributes to increased com-
mitment between the management and the employees and contract
enforcement (Kruse, Freeman, and Blasi, 2010). Accordingly, one may
expect unionized firms to use less temporary employment than nonunion-
ized ones as volatility rises: an extensive use of temporary contracts may
increase workforce segmentation of the internal labor market and reduce
2For example, Cappelli and Keller (2013) found that unionization is associated with lower use of tem-
porary workers, arguing that off-roll workers are less eligible to join the union (see also Kalleberg,
Reynolds, and Marsden 2003).
3Additional channels for the implementation of HRM practices include unionization, which makes
workers more willing to participate in employee involvement programs, because they feel the union will
protect their employment; and negotiations between employees and the management about the intro-
duction of new workplace practices that entail lower costs if the company has to deal with union special-
ists rather than individual workers. The new HRM are more likely to be accepted as the unions facilitate
information sharing and communication among workers and management.
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worker cohesion, ultimately hurting the ability of unions in favoring the
implementation of innovative HRM practices.4
To summarize, we argue that the sign and the magnitude of the interac-
tion term is an empirical issue, which lies at the core of our econometric
findings and which sheds light on the firms’ hiring policies in the presence
of unions and volatility in the economic environment.
Institutional Background
Italy is characterized by a two-tier bargaining system, with a dominant sec-
toral tier and a supplementary decentralized tier in which bargaining is usu-
ally carried out at the company level.5 The main objectives of the sectoral
agreements (National Collective Labor Agreements [NCLA]) are to protect
real wages and to set common economic and normative conditions for sec-
toral workers nationwide. At the decentralized level, it is possible to negoti-
ate performance and productivity-related wage increases. The second-level
bargaining may address a number of additional matters, such as working
hours, employment training, labor organization, and union relations in
order to gain flexibility for organizational changes and competitiveness.6
Agreements and conditions arrived at through bargaining at the decentra-
lized level are typically applied to all workers in the firm (Cella and Treu
1999). Second-level bargaining is subject to the limits and provisions
defined by the specific NCLAs applied in the productive unit.7
Italian law gives workers the right to join a union, engage in union activ-
ity, and organize a plant-level union representation structure. The main
4Another possible channel that we stressed in a previous version of the article concerns a ‘‘timing argu-
ment’’: when volatility raises, bargaining will occur more often, and because of this, the unions will be
even more concerned about an excessive use of temporary workers (Addison 2014). Indeed, a recent
report by the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living of Working Conditions (Eurofound 2015: 35)
argued that in most EU countries the duration of collective agreements since 2008 has reduced, mainly
as a result of the difficulties in agreeing to longer-term provisions in times of economic and financial tur-
moil and accelerated change. Coupled with anecdotal evidence from Italy, this context provides some
initial support for the conjecture that firm-union bargaining becomes more frequent when volatility
increases. Our data, however, do not allow us to provide any direct evidence on this issue. Moreover,
from a theoretical point of view, we acknowledge it is not trivial to establish under what conditions the
time-horizon of the bargaining process affects a union’s support to a firm’s hiring of temporary workers.
5A territorial level (mostly at the province level) also exists but is typically confined to particular indus-
tries, for example, construction and agriculture.
6No official data are available on the diffusion and content of decentralized bargaining. Survey data
suggest that the coverage is approximately 60% of employees and from 15 to 25% of firms (Damiani and
Ricci 2014), with greater incidence in manufacturing and larger firms. A large fraction of second-level
agreements (more than 60%) contain wage increases related to productivity gains, but agreements deal-
ing with workplace organizational changes, performance-based human resource management practices,
and employment flexibility are not uncommon and broadly cover the remaining 40% of cases.
7Decentralized agreements are only supplementary to, and applicative of, the NCLAs. The possibility
of opting-out or derogating from NCLAs was formally introduced only recently, after 2009, which is
beyond the sample period we analyze.
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workplace representative body is the so-called unitary workplace union
structures (Rappresentanze Sindacali Unitarie [RSU]).8 The RSU includes
features of works councils (for example, worker representatives are elected
by all permanent employees) but can also be associated with trade union
bodies (for example, worker representatives are usually elected from com-
peting candidates on trade unions lists).9 Hence, in Italy, union and
employee representation are entrusted to a single body (single-channel rep-
resentation) as opposed to a dual-channel system in which union delegates
operate alongside works councils.10 Worker representatives are able to
negotiate at the plant level on issues delegated from the industry-wide level,
and they have rights to information and consultation (D’Amuri and
Giorgiantonio 2015).
As for temporary contracts, a process of labor market deregulation
started in the mid-1990s (with the ‘‘Treu package’’ in 1997, the Legislative
Decree 368 of 2001, and the Law 30 of 2003). Similar to developments in
other European countries, these reforms introduced various types of tempo-
rary contracts without changing the legislation on permanent (open-ended)
contracts. Of the temporary contracts, fixed-term contracts are the most
popular, at around 7% of the workforce (compared to 84% of open-end
contracts).11 Permanent and fixed-term contracts differ only by virtue of a
fixed term. Because of employment protection legislation, fixed-term con-
tracts can be rescinded (or not renewed) more easily. All other working
conditions, such as wages, working times, pension rights, and probation
period, are identical, and firms pay the same social security contribution
rates for the two types of contracts.12 A fixed-term contract can be renewed
only once, and its cumulated duration cannot exceed three years with the
same firm.
Apprenticeship represents another form of temporary contracts, at
approximately 3% of the workforce. Firms can use this contract only for
young workers (up to 30 years of age), must provide certified training and,
8According to Italian law, workers’ representation can be set up in firms with more than 15 employees,
at the discretional initiative of workers. Hence, not all firms with more than 15 employees are unionized.
Furthermore, the national bargaining system at the industry level can introduce workers’ representation
in firms with fewer than 15 employees. In our sample of firms with 10 to 15 employees, the share of
unionized firms is approximately 7%, whereas for firms with more than 15 employees the share is
approximately 50%.
9Note that many features of Italian industrial relations are similar to those of other countries of conti-
nental Europe (see, e.g., OECD 2004, and Breda 2016 for France): multi-tier bargaining; no US-style
‘‘certification elections’’ required for union recognition; workers can be represented by more than a
union at the workplace; and unions are open shop.
10Note that an alternative plant-level union body (Rappresentanza Sindacale Aziendale [RSA]) can be
elected by the members of a particular union. RSUs have tended to replace RSAs, which are usually
found in smaller companies and in certain sectors such as banking.
11See Cappellari et al. (2012), as reference for these labor contracts shares.
12The available empirical evidence for Italy, however, has typically documented lower wages for fixed-
term workers (e.g., Picchio 2006).
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in exchange, are granted lower social security contributions. The maximum
cumulated duration is three years.13
In general, temporary and apprenticeship workers cannot elect the RSU
(and cannot be elected), although NCLAs can, and sometimes do, stipulate
for the contrary. Overall, it is plausible to assume that unions mainly repre-
sent the interests of insider and/or permanent workers, which in most of
the firms represent the biggest group of workers, hence including the med-
ian voter. Note that household surveys have generally documented an aging
trend in union membership across Europe (e.g., Eurobarometer), a trend
that is somewhat stronger in the case of the three largest Italian union con-
federations. As the latter maintain strong links (and influence) on the beha-
vior of workplace unions, and given that permanent workers tend to be
over-represented among older workers, one may speculate on an over-
representation of the interests of older and/or permanent workers over
those of younger and/or temporary workers, though no evidence is cur-
rently available to corroborate that observation.14
We report some evidence that the presence of trade unions at the work-
place may exert an influence on a firm’s demand for flexible contracts. In
particular, unions and workers’ representatives may be involved in shaping
the firm’s hiring policies through participation in firm-level specific agree-
ments on issues not already covered by NCLAs or by tailoring the sector-
wide dispositions to local circumstances. According to CNEL (2007),
‘‘numerical flexibility’’ and, in particular, ‘‘issues related to the use of atypi-
cal contracts’’ were covered in almost 50% of company-level agreements in
the period 1998 to 2006, albeit the exact content of the agreements is
uncertain. Union influence may also be exerted through more informal
consultation and involvement practices. This channel is likely to be relevant
at the productive-unit level between workers’ representatives and
13Firms can also employ collaboration contracts (collaborazioni), under which the workers are to be for-
mally considered as self-employed, although in some cases they perform tasks equal to those of employ-
ees of the firm. Because of reduced social security contributions, no training obligations, and the
possibility to extend and repeat these contracts at will, firms stand to benefit from this type of contract,
which represents around 3% of the workforce. Temporary agency contracts are also available to firms.
Because of agency fees, the cost of these external workers is higher than in the case of permanent con-
tracts, partly offset by lower hiring and firing costs. Their share in the workforce is still limited in Italy at
only 1.5%. We do not consider these two types of contracts because they are not formally employees of
the firm, and because it is not possible to distinguish in our data those collaboration or agency workers
who actually replace employees in the firm from those who carry out some genuine consultancy or have
short-term labor relations with the firms.
14Note that we cannot exclude that unions also work in the interest of temporary contracts. Even if
temporary workers cannot elect the RSU, unions might work for this group of workers since they expect
that a share of temporary workers will become permanent in the future. Actually, this distinction might
play a role when distinguishing between training and non-training workers. Given that the literature
shows that training contracts are more widely used as stepping stones to a permanent position (Berton
et al. 2011), they might be perceived by unions as closer to permanent contracts, and this difference
should emerge in our empirical analysis. Unfortunately, we cannot explore this issue further because we
do not have workers’ individual data.
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intermediate managers—especially in small- to medium-size firms—though
little is known on the spread of such practices (see Cerruti 2011).
Data and Descriptive Statistics
The empirical analysis is based on the Employer and Employee Survey
(RIL) conducted by ISFOL in 2005 and 2007 on a nationally representative
sample of firms operating in the non-agricultural private sector. The RIL
survey collects a rich set of information on personnel organization, indus-
trial relations, and other workplace characteristics. In particular, the RIL
allows us to distinguish between the two different typologies of temporary
contracts, that is, whether a training clause is explicitly considered. We
define as ‘‘training temporary contracts’’ (contratti a causa mista) any
apprenticeship contracts, training and work contracts (contratti di formazione
lavoro), or job insertion contracts (contratti di inserimento lavorativo). The
term ‘‘non-training temporary contracts’’ (contratti a tempo determinato) refers
to any other type of fixed-term contracts that contain no training clause.
To link information on workplace characteristics to indicators of firm
performance and economic volatility, we merge the RIL data set with
annual balance sheets and income statement data from the Analisi
Informatizzata Delle Aziende Italiane (AIDA) archive. The merge is carried
out through unique company tax codes. As AIDA covers only limited com-
panies with turnover of more than 100,000 euros, the RIL-AIDA merged
sample restricts the analysis to limited companies above this (rather mini-
mal) threshold.
Given our focus, we also exclude firms with fewer than 10 employees to
retain only those firms characterized by a minimum level of organizational
structure and for which the share of employees in different types of con-
tracts can be meaningfully computed. Further, very small firms are rarely
characterized by union representation. Our final sample includes more
than 6,600 firms.
Table 1 displays descriptive statistics. The first four columns refer to the
pooled 2005 to 2007 original RIL data, considering both the full sample
(firms with at least 1 employee) and the subsample (firms with more than
10 employees). The last two columns show the descriptive statistics for the
RIL-AIDA merged sample used in the article. As expected, the main differ-
ences emerge from including and excluding micro firms below 10 employ-
ees. Once we take the set of firms with more than 10 employees as our
reference population, the additional restriction imposed by matching the
sample with the AIDA data produces only marginal differences in the
descriptive statistics.
In our final RIL-AIDA sample, the overall share of fixed-term contracts is
9.8%, which can be split into the share of non-training contracts (6.1%)
and the share of training contracts (3.7%). As for the other variables of
interest, we created a dummy variable (‘‘union’’ for short) that indicates
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whether workers have established any form of workers’ representation at
the workplace that is legally entitled to participate in the firm-level bargain-
ing process.15 Such workplace representation is found in about 40% of the
firms.
Another important variable in the analysis is the volatility measure, which
is computed as the average standard deviation of log sales over the period
1997 to 2005, calculated at the three-digit classification of economic activity
(NACE, over 450 sectors). We used the AIDA data set to compute our mea-
sure of volatility, as this data set has yearly information on firms’ sales and
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics and Data Selection Process
RIL RIL-AIDA
Full sample  10 employees  10 employees
Descriptive category Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Variables
Share of temporary contracts 0.100 0.165 0.096 0.147 0.098 0.149
Share of non-training temporary contracts 0.058 0.134 0.064 0.133 0.061 0.134
Share of training temporary contracts 0.042 0.105 0.031 0.071 0.037 0.076
Union 0.290 0.454 0.413 0.492 0.400 0.491
Share of female workers 0.371 0.289 0.336 0.261 0.323 0.267
Share of white collars 0.428 0.320 0.405 0.300 0.407 0.297
Share of blue collars 0.507 0.336 0.532 0.319 0.539 0.313
Share of trainees 0.204 0.323 0.231 0.328 0.200 0.316
Firms age (years) 24.181 17.336 26.774 18.735 22.229 16.018
Volatility — — — — 0.398 0.201
Macro-region
North West 0.359 0.480 0.381 0.486 0.368 0.482
North East 0.259 0.438 0.272 0.445 0.260 0.439
Central 0.195 0.396 0.182 0.386 0.196 0.397
South 0.187 0.390 0.165 0.371 0.177 0.381
Sector of activity
Quarrying, water, gas, and
electricity distribution
0.039 0.193 0.037 0.189 0.008 0.088
Textiles 0.143 0.350 0.158 0.365 0.129 0.335
Manufacturing 0.099 0.298 0.110 0.313 0.180 0.384
Mechanics 0.170 0.375 0.173 0.379 0.148 0.355
Construction 0.107 0.309 0.110 0.313 0.161 0.368
Trade, hotels, and restaurants 0.145 0.353 0.128 0.335 0.172 0.377
Transport and communication 0.057 0.233 0.056 0.229 0.040 0.196
Business services 0.121 0.326 0.110 0.313 0.073 0.260
Education, health, and other
public services
0.120 0.325 0.117 0.322 0.090 0.286
Year 2007 0.511 0.500 0.513 0.500 0.447 0.497
Observations 11,169 7,612 6,655
Notes: Sample weights used. RIL, Employer and Employee Survey; AIDA, Analisi Informatizzata Aziende
Italiane.
15In accordance with the institutional framework presented in the Institutional Background section,
we take as an indicator of unionization the presence of either RSUs or RSAs at the workplace.
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numbers of employees (but not on unionization and contract types) for
incorporated businesses in Italy over a relatively long time period. Note that
our measure of demand volatility is computed at the sectoral level, rather
than at the firm level, which helps minimize endogeneity concerns related
to this variable. Table 1 shows that the demand volatility measure has a
mean equal to 0.4 in the sample. Table 1 also sets out the descriptive statis-
tics for all the other control variables used in the regression analysis.
Econometric Analysis
Our econometric analysis is performed using regression models to estimate
the following equation:
TCit=b1volct+b2unionit+b3volct 3 unionit+Xitd+ eitð1Þ
with t = 2005, 2007. TCit denotes the share of workers with a temporary con-
tract in firm i at time t, volct is our measure of a firm’s output demand volati-
lity (in the sector c to which firm i belongs), and unionit is a dummy variable
indicating union presence at the workplace. Volct*unionit is an interaction
term capturing the effect of the interplay between volatility and workplace
unionization on the share of fixed-term contracts.
The vector Xit contains firm-level control variables that may affect the
dependent variable and may be correlated with workplace unionization and
volatility. In all the models reported below, we include the following set of
baseline control variables: the share of female workers, the shares of blue-
and white-collar workers, the firm’s age (in years), firm-size dummies (3
classes defined in terms of employees), sector dummies (10 industries), geo-
graphical area dummies (4 macro regions), and a dummy for year 2007. In
none of the cases did experimentation with models containing subsets of
these basic control variables have any appreciable effect on the estimates of
our relevant variables, and they are therefore not reported. Models with
expanded sets of control variables are discussed below. Finally, eit is an idio-
syncratic error whose properties are specified in the next section, depend-
ing on the chosen econometric approach.
Endogeneity and Methodological Issues
One of the main challenges in our empirical analysis concerns the potential
endogeneity of the union variable. The existing literature suggests that a
sharp causal effect can be estimated only under specific circumstances, such
as the regression discontinuity designs offered by the union certification
elections in the United States (DiNardo and Lee 2004; Lee and Mas 2012).
Unfortunately, the institutional settings of most countries of continental
Europe do not exhibit such peculiar discontinuities or other readily exploi-
table sources of exogenous variation. For instance, in these countries unions
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do not generally need to win a majority election to be recognized as bar-
gaining partners.
Breda (2015) has argued that European countries have, however, other
peculiar features that can be exploited for implementing an appropriate
research design. He investigated the case of France, claiming that workplace
unionization does not systematically target more profitable or productive
firms and is obtained in a relatively large number of firms. This finding is
because, under French law, it is typically very easy to organize a firm’s work-
ers in a union, since what is needed is only to find a worker who is willing to
act as union representative or to contact the local union officials, who are
always willing to help set up a union in a firm. For this reason, Breda (2015)
assumed that his estimates were unlikely to be biased by unions selecting
only the best firms, and hence, the assignment to treatment can be assumed
as quasi-random, conditional on observables. In such a framework, ordinary
least squares (OLS) regressions can identify a causal effect.
The discussion in Breda (2015) matters also for our research goals, since
the Italian institutional framework is rather similar to the French one: as dis-
cussed in Institutional Background, it is also relatively easy and low cost to
set up a union in Italy. Nonetheless, one can still question the random
assignment assumption even for countries of Continental Europe for several
reasons. First, even if one assumed away any self-selection on the workers’
side, this might not be the case from the firms’ side. For instance, some
firms might have a strong preference against having a local union and may
behave strategically to achieve this goal, granting workers some favorable
economic and working conditions as a counterpart of an informal commit-
ment for not setting up a local union. Second, in our analysis a number of
variables might be expected to affect both a firm’s union status and the pro-
pensity to hire temporary workers. An example of such variables could be
the managerial culture and ability. Failing to control for these factors may
potentially bias the relevant estimates. A firm culture promoting high-
performance resource management practices and high investment in
human capital might generate both a limited use of temporary workers
(particularly of the buffer type) and a cooperative environment conducive
to worker representation, and hence union presence. Third, Breda (2015)
also showed that even if the union variable is considered as exogenous, its
bargaining power likely depends on the share of unionized workers in the
firm, which in turn can hardly be considered as exogenous to the share of
temporary workers.
For these reasons, in our study we depart from Breda’s (2015) empirical
strategy. Starting with simple OLS models, we base our preferred econo-
metric analyses on two alternative approaches: fixed-effect (FE) models and
instrument variable (IV) models. We are aware that both methods have spe-
cific advantages and disadvantages in the context of our application. For
this reason, we do not depend solely on either the FE or the IV approach
and, instead, conduct our empirical analyses using both of them in parallel.
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We are more confident about the validity of our results when they are
robust to the two alternative approaches. We believe we cannot do much
more to improve the identification of a causal effect given the institutional
framework and the available data.
An IV approach can potentially deal with time-invariant and time-variant
omitted variable biases, including measurement error in union status. Of
course, a major challenge—still largely ubiquitous in the literature on the
effects of unions—lies in finding suitable instruments. Ideally, we would like
to instrument union status in a first-differenced model. This empirical strat-
egy would cope with firm-level time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity (by
first differentiating Equation (1)), while controlling for time-specific
omitted variables and measurement error in union status (through IV of
the first differentiated model). It is no simple task to find valid instruments
for the change in a firm’s union status, however, and for this reason we had
to abandon the panel IV approach.
Instead, we resort to a simpler IV framework, in which a firm’s union sta-
tus is instrumented by the two-year lagged mean unionization at the three-
digit industry and region level. Clearly, this IV strategy means limiting the
analysis to the 2007 data sample, since our main instrument is derived using
the 2005 wave.16 To increase efficiency, our preferred IV specification uses
the four-year lagged industry profit per employee as an additional
instrument.17
We believe that both variables make for reasonable IV candidates.
Consider lagged mean unionization. First, most temporary contracts are of
very short duration, on average less than a year. Hence, a two-year lag in
industry-level unionization is not expected to have any direct impact on the
current use of temporary employment, once current unionization at the
workplace is controlled for. Although longer lags would, in principle, be
desirable, we cannot construct them on the basis of the available data.18
Second, mean unionization at the industry and territorial level is a strong
predictor of current workplace unionization. Empirically, this result is
clearly supported by the first-stage statistics we report below. More impor-
tant, the predictive power of the instrument is to be expected in light of the
institutional framework discussed above. According to Italian law, workplace
unionization emerges out of the initiative of a firm’s workers. Setting up the
process leading to workers’ representation, however, requires expert knowl-
edge and operational support, which the local structures of the union con-
federations are able and willing to provide. In short, past unionization at
16No other data set is currently available for Italy that would allow us to compute mean unionization at
a finely disaggregated level.
17‘‘Profit per employee’’ is here measured by the Gross Operating Surplus available in AIDA, divided
by the firm’s number of employees, and then averaged at the three-digit industry level.
18The results by Salvatori (2012), showing that firms under the threat of unionization do not increase
their demand for temporary employment, also offer evidence that reverse causality may not be a major
concern.
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the industry and territorial levels acts as an incubator for workplace unioni-
zation. Moreover, the single channel of representation entails that union
officials, in most cases external to the firm, are actively involved in consulta-
tion and negotiation activities.19
Turning to past profitability, this factor is also a strong predictor of cur-
rent unionization.20 Past profitability is generally considered a determinant
of unionization, as unions can expect to share rents where rents are size-
able. A four-year lag in industry profitability should suffice to remove con-
cerns about possible direct effects on the current share of temporary
workers. In a robustness check, we also consider a six-year lagged profit vari-
able as an instrument. To make our case even more compelling, we experi-
ment with specifications that include and exclude current firm profitability
from the list of controls, as well as instrument using lagged firm profitability
instead of lagged industry profitability.
A second solution to the potential endogeneity of union status is to
assume that omitted variables are time invariant. Hence, an individual-
specific intercept, ai , is added as a component of the error term in
Equation (1); ai can be freely correlated with union status or other right-
hand-side variables in the model. In such a framework, consistent estimates
may be obtained through linear models with fixed effects (FE). Since firms
are observed during two points in time (2005 and 2007) in our data, we can
estimate fixed-effect models. We have to recognize, however, that limited
‘‘within’’ variability and the attenuation bias resulting from measurement
errors—especially in fixed-effect models—might be a challenge for this
identification strategy.21
Before turning to the results, we will briefly discuss the pros and cons of
using linear models (as in our IV and FE regressions) as opposed to non-
linear models such as Tobit regressions. The latter are a standard choice to
account for the double-censored nature of our dependent variable, the frac-
tion of workers with a fixed-term contract lying between 0 and 1 by con-
struction (Houseman 2001; Cappelli and Neumark 2004; Lee and Kim
2005). Linear models do not account for the censored nature of the depen-
dent variable; however, they are better placed for dealing with the potential
19The 1993 Tripartite Agreement explicitly mentions that the competent territorial structures of the
trade union associations (that have signed the NCLA applied in the productive unit) participate in col-
lective bargaining within the firm alongside workers’ representatives.
20Salvatori (2009) reports IV estimates of the effect of unions on the probability of firms employing
any temporary workers, using a six-year lagged employment as an instrument for union status. The argu-
ment in favor of such an instrument is that lagged employment can be expected to be correlated with
current union status, because union status is a persistent feature of the workplace, and employment size
is a known determinant of union status. Our computations, however, showed that long lags of employ-
ment (which are available from the information contained in AIDA) are only weak instruments in our
application, with first-stage F statistics that never exceed critical values at conventional levels.
21As for the within variability, approximately 25% of firms change union status in the two years (from
unionized to non-unionized and vice versa), technically providing ‘‘enough’’ variability for a fixed-effect
estimation.
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endogeneity of right-hand-side variables and provide a simpler framework
to compute average marginal effects in the presence of variable interactions
(Angrist and Pischke 2009).22 For these reasons, our main analysis is con-
ducted through linear models. Nevertheless, for robustness we report in the
Appendix the results obtained with both standard and random-effect Tobit
models, which are consistent with the results derived using linear models.
Econometric Results
OLS Models
Table 2 displays the estimated coefficients of Equation (1), focusing for the
sake of brevity on only the most relevant variables.23 The first column of
Table 2 sets out the OLS coefficients of a simpler version of Equation (1)
that omits the interaction term. If the conditional quasi-random assumption
discussed by Breda (2015) holds, then even OLS estimates can provide
unbiased estimates.
Table 2 shows that economic volatility has a positive and statistically sig-
nificant effect on the utilization of flexible contractual arrangements, which
is consistent with the previous literature arguing that volatility encourages
firms to employ temporary workers to adjust the labor input more easily.
More specifically, a one standard deviation increase in volatility is associated
with an increase of approximately 2 percentage points in the use of tempo-
rary contracts. This value represents quite a sizable effect, amounting to a
nearly 20% increase with respect to the baseline share of temporary con-
tracts standing at 9.8%.
Column (1) also shows that the presence of a union in the workplace is
associated with a lower use of temporary contracts (–2.3 percentage points).
As argued above, one possible interpretation of this finding might be that
temporary employees are less likely than permanent employees to be union-
ized and engaged in industrial relations. This result implies that hiring
workers on a temporary basis may significantly weaken union bargaining
power and its representativeness in industrial relations. If this is indeed so,
then the unions would discourage the use of fixed-term contracts to favor
outcomes for the insiders in future bargaining negotiations (Bentolila and
Dolado 1994; Booth 1995).
To gain further insights into these mechanisms, we re-estimate Equation
(1) by OLS including the interaction term in column (2). In this case, the
coefficient of unions is no longer statistically significant. As for the coeffi-
cient of the interaction term, it is now negative and statistically significant.
22Note that the existing IV Tobit models (see for instance IVTOBIT implemented in STATA) require
that the endogenous variable be continuous, and hence are not suitable for dealing with the endogeneity
of dummy-type right-hand-side variables, like our union status indicator.
23The estimated coefficients of the control variables are briefly discussed in the Appendix, in which we
compare our results with those from standard and random-effect Tobit models.
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This finding suggests that the union’s impact on the use of temporary
employment is driven partly by economic uncertainty.
IV Models
Given that the exogeneity assumption for the union variable is questionable,
for the above-mentioned reasons, we move to a series of IV models, col-
lected in columns (3) to (8) of Table 2.24 Column (3) refers to the specifi-
cation with no interaction between union and volatility. Workplace
unionization is treated as an endogenous variable and instrumented with
the two-year lagged mean unionization at the industry and regional level,
and the equation is exactly identified. The estimates in column (3) confirm
the previous finding that volatility has a positive impact on the demand for
temporary workers. Note that the direct union effect is now positive, though
not statistically significant.
The specification in column (4) includes an endogenous interaction
term, which has to be treated as an endogenous variable in the estimation.
The additional instrument is given by the interaction between volatility and
the two-year lagged mean unionization variable, and the equation is again
exactly identified. The estimates largely confirm our previous results: a posi-
tive impact of volatility and a negative interaction term between volatility
and union presence. Additionally, the main effect of union presence is posi-
tive and statistically significant at the 10% level.
The specification in column (5) adds the four-year lagged industry profits
as an additional instrument. The equation is now over-identified, and it is
possible to provide a test of over-identifying restrictions. As shown by the
Hansen J statistics, we are unable to reject the null hypothesis for the over-
identifying restrictions. The results are very similar to the ones in the previ-
ous column, but now the main effect of union is also statistically significant
at conventional levels.
In the remaining columns, from (6) to (8), additional controls are pro-
gressively included for robustness. We begin in column (6) by controlling
for current profit per worker, measured at the firm level by the gross oper-
ating margin divided by the number of workers. Once a firm’s current prof-
itability is controlled for, past industry profits are more likely to be
redundant in Equation (1) and hence to constitute a valid instrument.
In column (7) we add a large number of dummies (around 200) for the
specific NCLAs applied in the firm; our aim is to control for more detailed
industry characteristics than in previous specifications. The dummies also
account for any influence arising from the sector-wide bargaining and in
consideration of the hierarchical nature of the Italian two-tier bargaining
regime. For instance, Italian labor law (Legislative Decree 368/2001) dele-
gates to the various NCLAs the role of fixing the maximum percentage of
24In the IV models, standard errors are clustered at the three-digit industry and regional level. This
choice is consistent with the variability of one of the instruments.
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fixed-term workers in a firm’s workforce. It is possible to include a large
number of NCLA dummies in our IV models, as the definition of these
NCLAs is related to, but not entirely overlapping with, the three-digit indus-
try classification we use to compute our instruments. The estimates and
diagnostics in column (7) are once again supportive of our earlier conclu-
sions. This supporting result is also the case for our final IV model, in col-
umn (8), which adds the firm’s capital intensity (the stock of the material
fixed assets from the firm’s balance sheets, divided by the number of
employees) to proxy for a firm’s technology.
Before turning to our fixed-effect models, we consider a number of
robustness checks for the IV models, which are included in Appendix Table
A.1. First, one potential concern regarding our IV identification is that a
two-year lag in union status could be correlated with demand conditions
two years ago, which in turn are probably correlated with demand condi-
tions in 2007. For this reason, we run additional IV models, by including
proxies for productivity and demand shocks for both 2005 and 2007. We do
so by inserting controls for the use of materials (intermediate goods) by the
firm and/or the industry in our former IV regressions. The rationale is that
the use of materials ought to be high when demand is high. This thinking
echoes the control function approach used in the estimation of firm pro-
ductivity equations (e.g., Levinsohn and Petrin 2003) and is in the spirit of
the approach followed by Breda (2015) in some of his specifications.
Specifically, starting with the most complete IV regression of column (8) in
Table 2, we additionally include controls for 1) firm-level use of materials in
2005 (column (1) of Table A.1); 2) firm-level use of materials in 2005 and
2007 (column (2) of Table A.1); and 3) both firm-level and industry-level
use of materials in 2005 and 2007 (column (3) of Table A.1). Second,
although we are unable to exploit further lags in unionization, we can do so
for our profit instrument. Hence, in column (4) of Table A.1 we present an
additional specification in which we make use of the six-years lagged value
of mean industry profits as an instrument, instead of the four-year lag of the
baseline estimates. In column (5), the same six-years lagged instrument is
obtained from firm-level profits on a slightly smaller sample and a somewhat
more parsimonious specification. Our results survive all these robustness
checks and are basically unchanged.
Fixed-Effect Models
A series of linear fixed-effect models are reported in columns (1) to (5) of
Table 3. As discussed earlier, fixed-effect models deal with omitted variable
bias arising from time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity and provide an
alternative identification strategy to the IV models presented so far. We start
in column (1) with our baseline FE model, without including the interac-
tion term, while keeping all the time-varying controls as in the OLS and IV
models. Note that because the NCLAs applied in a particular firm constitute
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a time-invariant attribute, all our FE models also absorb the specific features
of the sectoral collective bargaining and other time-invariant industry char-
acteristics. Column (1) shows that while the coefficient for volatility is still
positive and significant, the coefficient of union becomes very small, nega-
tive, and insignificant. This finding is consistent with our results so far: at
low volatility the union impact is positive; at high volatility the impact is neg-
ative. If we exclude the interaction term, the main effect becomes very small
(and insignificant) as it reflects what happens at average volatility. Column
(2) points out that the central results of the article are restored when rein-
troducing the interaction term, with a positive coefficient for union and a
negative one for the interaction term, both statistically significant.
It is interesting to compare the results in column (2) of Table 3 with the
OLS estimates of column (2) in Table 2. What emerges is that controlling
for time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity increases the coefficient of the
direct union effect, suggesting that firm unobserved heterogeneity, our
proxy for the quality of the firm, is positively correlated with union presence
and negatively correlated with the share of temporary contracts, as one may
have expected.
In column (3) we attempt to control for idiosyncratic productivity shocks
that might be correlated to both the firm’s demand for temporary workers
and workplace unionization. Productivity shocks are typically not observed
by the econometrician but might be at least partly anticipated by firms and
workers. One simple way to deal with this concern is to rely on a firm’s use
Table 3. Fixed-Effect (FE) Models, All Temporary Workers
Fixed-effect models
Models (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volatility 0.102** 0.100** 0.157*** 0.146*** 0.144***
(s.e.) 0.055 0.051 0.058 0.058 0.058
Union –0.004 0.037*** 0.042*** 0.040*** 0.041***
(s.e.) 0.007 0.014 0.017 0.017 0.017
Volatility*Union –0.100*** –0.125*** –0.121*** –0.123***
(s.e.) 0.031 0.039 0.039 0.039
Constant term –0.010* –0.002 –0.011* –0.013** –0.013**
(s.e.) 0.006 0.005 0.006 0.006 0.006
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional controls Material
(in log)
As in (3) plus industry
mean material1
As in (4) plus
log employment
and log current profit
Observations 2,847 2,247 2,247 2,247
Notes: Coefficient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. Controls include the share of female
workers, the shares of blue- and white-collar workers, the firm’s age, firm size dummies (three classes
defined in terms of number of employees), sector dummies (10), and area dummies (4). s.e., standard
error.
*, **, *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
1At three-digit industry and region.
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of raw material as a proxy for idiosyncratic shocks. As in the IV models of
Table A.1, the idea is that firms increase their use of raw material when they
face an increase in the demand for their output. Column (4) further
enriches the list of controls by adding industry average consumption of
intermediate goods (at the three-digit NACE level). Finally, in column (5)
we add a firm’s total employment and current profit (in logs) as additional
controls.25
Sum Up of the Econometric Results and Quantification of the Impacts
The overall picture is fairly reassuring, with all the qualitative, and to a large
extent also the quantitative results, being similar between the IV and the
fixed-effects models.26 Moreover, since the existing findings in the literature
concerning the impact of unions on the use of temporary contract provide
ambiguous evidence, our results might be seen as a way to characterize and
partially explain this ambiguity, suggesting that the union impact can be
positive or negative depending on economic volatility.
In the section titled The Interplay between Unions and Volatility, we dis-
cussed various direct and indirect mechanisms for the interaction term
between workplace unionization and volatility. Overall, our results on the
emergence of a negative interaction term suggest that explanations related
to a weakening of workers’ cohesion and unions’ bargaining position, in
turn linked to the fact that temporary workers provide lower support to
union activity, dominate the explanations based on a pure buffer stock
effect, with its alleged role as a protection mechanism for the insiders.
To quantify this ‘‘smoothing effect’’ of the interaction term, we compute
the union effect at different values of volatility. Using the IV estimates in
the richer specification of column (8) in Table 2, we obtain that unions
increase the proportion of temporary workers by 2.7 percentage points
when volatility is low, that is, at the first decile of the volatility distribution.27
The same effect is rapidly reduced in the presence of higher volatility: it is
virtually zero if volatility is at the median and becomes negative (–5.1 per-
centage points) when volatility is high (at the 90th percentile).28 Similar
effects are obtained with the FE estimates: using the estimates in column
(5) of Table 3, the union impact is positive (1.6 percentage points) at low
volatility (defined as above), 0 at mean volatility, and negative (–3.5 percent-
age points) at high volatility.
25Profits, material, and the stock of capital are all variables computed, for each firm and year, from
the AIDA data set. Hence, they are firm-specific and time-varying.
26As a robustness check we include in the Appendix the estimates derived using standard and
random-effect Tobit models, which also provide a consistent picture of the results obtained using linear
models.
27Notice that since volatility never reaches zero, the main effect of unions does not have a natural eco-
nomic interpretation in the estimates.
28Given the high significance of the underlying estimated coefficients, all these average treatment
effects are also statistically significant.
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Contract Type Matters: Training Temporary Contracts versus Non-Training
Temporary Contracts
In this section we investigate the existence of any relevant heterogeneity
across two different types of temporary contracts: non-training compared to
training temporary contracts. We focus on this heterogeneity because in
most European countries, temporary contracts are often, though not in all
cases, associated with training and/or apprenticeship features (Eurofound
2014; Cedefop 2016). This heterogeneity can play a crucial role for firms,
which can decide to use strategically the two types of contracts depending
on the firms’ goals in human resource practices, with different welfare
implications from the workers’ standpoint (e.g., Berton et al. 2011).
Following our earlier discussion in the section titled Econometric
Analysis, we present in parallel and compare the results based on both IV
models and FE models. We believe that the analysis carried out in this sec-
tion is of interest because most of the papers in the literature do not distin-
guish between types of temporary contracts, yet unions (as firms) might
perceive and treat the various types in different ways.
We begin by discussing the results of IV estimations of Equation (1) for
non-training temporary contracts (column (1)) and for training temporary
contracts (column (2)) in Table 4. The specification and list of instruments
is the same as before (see column (6) in Table 2).
Both sets of estimates clearly show that the effects of volatility and union
presence are markedly heterogeneous across contract types. The effect of
volatility is large and statistically significant only for non-training temporary
contracts, whereas it is 10 times smaller and not statistically significant for
training temporary contracts. This finding is consistent with the dissimilar
role of the two contracts from the firm’s standpoint. In coping with a vola-
tile economic environment in the presence of a high level of protection for
permanent workers, it is cost effective for firms to rely on non-training tem-
porary contracts rather than contracts with a training clause, as the training
investment would be lost upon the temporary worker’s dismissal.
The effect of union presence is positive and statistically significant for
non-training contracts and negative and not significant for training con-
tracts. This finding can also be rationalized on the basis of the nature of the
two types of contracts and may reflect both the interests of the unions and
the firms. The unions have an interest in the presence of a positive share of
the non-training temporary contracts, which can in principle offer some
protection to permanent workers. By contrast, the training contracts cannot
credibly work as a buffer to protect insiders, as firms will be less willing to
sacrifice their training investments to accommodate the interests of the
union. Moreover, in the presence of a union, firms as well may have an
interest in hiring on the cheaper type of temporary contracts (i.e., those
that carry no training obligations) to countervail any union-driven labor
cost push.
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The sign of the interaction effect further qualifies these findings. As dis-
cussed in the section The Interplay between Unions and Volatility, one
potential explanation for the negative interaction term is that, in a volatile
economic environment, the unions become more mindful about the loss of
bargaining power because of the high fraction of temporary workers.
Although temporary contracts are used by firms to cope with volatile eco-
nomic environments, the temporary workers are less prone to engage in
industrial relations (typically organized by permanent workers), and their
presence is thus expected to weaken the strength or ‘‘voice’’ of the unions
in the bargaining process. This effect clearly emerges in the case of non-
training temporary workers, who are expected to engage even less in union
activity and to leave the firm more easily than training temporary workers,
as volatility increases. Other supporting mechanisms are more indirect, as
discussed earlier, and emphasize the reduced need by firms to use the more
disposable type of temporary employment when, because of increased vola-
tility, the unions might moderate their wage claims and provide more inter-
nal employment flexibility. Such an approach embraces a more cooperative
attitude with respect to the management.
In columns (3) and (4) of Table 4, we display the estimates of richer
specifications that add the NCLA dummies. All our results for non-training
temporary contracts are confirmed, whereas no union or volatility effects
are detected for training temporary contracts.
The rest of Table 4, columns (5) to (8), shows the results obtained with
selected specifications of FE models, estimated separately for the two types
of temporary contracts. Columns (5) and (6) are based on a rich specifica-
tion that controls for the same baseline list of controls as in Table 2, plus
firm-level profits per workers and usage of intermediate goods (log materi-
als). Columns (7) and (8) report the results for corresponding models that
also control for a firm’s capital stock and total employment. Once again, a
consistent picture emerges with respect to the results discussed earlier, in
terms both of the sign of our relevant variables and, though to a lesser
extent, of the estimated magnitudes.
Conclusions
In this article, we focus on the interplay between unions and demand volati-
lity in driving the propensity by firms to use temporary contracts. Using
Italian firm-level data and an identification strategy based on a series of IV
and fixed-effect models, in parallel, we obtain the following results.
First, volatility has a positive impact on the firm’s use of temporary con-
tracts. This effect is consistent with the previous literature showing that vola-
tility encourages firms to employ temporary workers to adjust the labor
input more easily.
Second, although the impact of workplace unionization is not statistically
significant in the baseline estimates, a clear pattern emerges when we use a
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specification that includes an interaction term with volatility. In particular,
we find that the impact of workplace unionization is positive for low levels
of volatility and negative for high levels. In such a framework, unions are
able to smooth the impact of volatility for firms, with respect to nonunion
firms. We provide a wide set of explanations for this novel finding. Since
the existing literature so far has derived only mixed evidence concerning
the impact of unions on temporary contracts, our results might be seen as a
way to characterize and partially explain this inconclusive evidence, suggest-
ing that the union impact may crucially depend on economic volatility.
Third, the effects of unions and volatility are heterogeneous across types
of temporary contracts. The presence of unions per se increases the
demand for non-training temporary contracts, as does a higher demand
volatility, yet these effects are never detected in the case of training tempo-
rary contracts. The negative interaction effect is also only statistically signifi-
cant for non-training temporary contracts. We have argued that these
findings are attributable to the different nature of the two contractual
arrangements. In particular, non-training temporary contracts are typically
used by firms and are possibly encouraged by unions as a buffer stock for
insider workers, that is, standard permanent workers. At the same time,
because of their lower prospects as core members of the firm’s workforce,
workers holding a non-training temporary contract are less likely to engage
in union support than are workers holding training contracts. The latter are
instead more likely to play a screening role for a firm’s core-staff needs, and
they are generally more expensive. Hence, training temporary contracts
cannot be considered as the prototypical type of disposable temporary con-
tract for both the firms and the union’s insiders, and their use by firms does
not depend on union status and volatility.
From a methodological point of view, we discussed earlier how European
research on the impact of unions is limited by the inability to exploit a sharp
econometric identification, as in the case of the US-style union certification
elections, and the consequent need to rely on alternative identification stra-
tegies, such as IV and fixed-effect models. We acknowledge the limitations of
these approaches, in our case partly derived from the data at hand, and
stress that we are reassured of the validity of the results because a consistent
and mutually reinforcing picture emerges when using either approach.
Despite these potential limitations, we argue that the article contributes
to the literature on unions and temporary employment along both a beha-
vioral and a policy perspective. As for the former, we believe our article pro-
vides new insights into the role played by worker representation at the
workplace in affecting human resource management and firms’ personnel
policies. We discussed various direct and indirect mechanisms underlying
the impact of unions on the firms’ use of temporary contracts.
Unfortunately, our data do not allow us to disentangle the different
mechanisms at work. Nevertheless, our empirical results on the emergence
of a robust negative interaction term lead us to conclude that explanations
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related to a unions’ weaker-bargaining position (temporary workers provide
lower support to unions) dominate explanations based on a pure buffer
stock effect. Moreover, our findings about the interaction between unions
and the volatility of the economic environment suggest that unions’ strate-
gies can actually be significantly different according to local and/or industry
market conditions, that is, the economic volatility.
These findings are also relevant from a policy perspective, particularly
with reference to the European and Italian debate about the relative merits
of centralization versus decentralization in industrial relations. In recent
years, policy prescriptions from national and international institutions have
recommended a shift away from nationwide sectoral bargaining to firm-
level bargaining in an attempt to recover flexibility and competitiveness for
firms. Our results offer some novel insights to this debate. First, our findings
might provide additional evidence supporting the decentralization of indus-
trial relations at the local and/or firm level. Intuitively, the higher the
decentralization level of the union in the industrial relations, the higher the
union’s effectiveness in dealing with local market conditions, that is, volati-
lity in our study. This policy argument is new in the literature, because
decentralization is usually supported by arguments related to firms’ adjust-
ment processes and to incentives for the workforce.
Second, our results have implications for the interactions of different
labor market reforms. In recent years, many EU countries have attempted
to reduce Employment Protection Legislation (EPL) for permanent work-
ers, partly in an effort to reverse the labor market duality that has emerged
since the 1980s. At the same time, many EU countries have reformed their
industrial relations to promote firm-level bargaining, to widen its scope, and
to enhance derogation to labor legislation and sectoral collective agree-
ments. These concomitant developments in the labor market have led some
commentators to express concerns that one perhaps unintended conse-
quence of the prescriptions to promote decentralization might ultimately
be an increase in labor market duality,29 especially in the face of increased
volatility related to globalization, technological change, and the post–Great
Recession period. Overall, however, the results of our study indicate that
such worries might be misplaced. In particular, our finding of a negative
interaction term offers little support to the alleged role of workplace unioni-
zation as a contributing factor to labor market duality in the face of rising
economic uncertainty for a given level of EPL. This interpretation crucially
depends on what happens when volatility increases to the workers who
would have had temporary jobs at unionized firms if unions had not
29In the case of Italy, for instance, policy interventions to reduce EPL for permanent workers have
been recently enacted in the so-called Jobs Act, whereas interventions aimed at promoting decentraliza-
tion and enhancing derogation have been achieved, respectively, by means of fiscal incentives in 2008
and 2011 and by Legislative Decree law 138/2011, article 8. In this new institutional setting, agreements
struck at the level of the firm may offset the reduction in EPL for permanent workers stipulated by
national legislation and increase the utilization of temporary employment.
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followed such a policy of reducing temporary contracts (negative interaction
term). Do these workers obtain permanent or temporary jobs elsewhere, or
do they become unemployed? Providing further evidence on such issues
might be an important task for future research, making use of longitudinal
employer-employee data that would allow identification of worker flows
when volatility increases in unionized versus nonunionized firms.
Appendix
Robustness Checks: Tobit Regressions
In this Appendix, we include results obtained when using simple Tobit
regressions to account for the double-censored nature of our dependent
variable. The error term is here assumed to be normally distributed and
uncorrelated with the explanatory variables included in Equation (1).
Results are shown in Table A.2. Models (1) and (2) provide Tobit esti-
mates for the pooled sample, that is, waves 2005 and 2007, which we refer
to as pooled Tobit. The upper part of the table shows the average treatment
effects (ATE), namely, the change in the share of fixed-term contracts asso-
ciated with a unit change in a given covariate, averaged over the sample dis-
tribution of the other covariates in the model. Note that because of the
nonlinear nature of the model, computing the ATE of a variable such as
union status requires that information be used on both the direct effect of
union (coefficient b2 in Equation (1)) and the interaction effect (b3 in
Equation (1)). The lower part of the table therefore also sets out the esti-
mated coefficients for our main variables of interest.30
Model (1) in Table A.2 shows that economic volatility has a positive and
statistically significant effect on the utilization of flexible contractual
arrangements, with an estimated ATE at 0.049. This result implies that a 1
standard deviation increase in volatility (equal to 0.2) raises the fraction of
temporary workers in the firm by 1 percentage point (= 0.2*0.049). The esti-
mates in model (1) also show that the presence of a union in the workplace
is associated with a lesser use of temporary contracts. Specifically, the ATE
of union presence is a statistically significant reduction of 1 percentage
point in the use of such contracts.
We then estimate Equation (1) with the inclusion of the interaction term
(model (2)). The direct effect of unions is found to be positive, but not
30It may be interesting to compare the estimated OLS coefficients derived in the article with the
related coefficients obtained with the Tobit models of Table A.2. The first thing to observe is the close
similarity in the two sets of estimated coefficients; however, note that the magnitude of the estimated
ATE is somewhat different. So, while volatility raises the fraction of temporary employment by 0.1 in the
OLS models, the impact is reduced by roughly half in the Tobit model. By contrast, the union impact is
stronger in the OLS than in the Tobit model. These differences in part relate to the nonlinear nature of
the Tobit model; specifically, the Tobit ATE is computed conditionally on the dependent variable lying
in the zero-one interval, whereas no such restriction is enforced in computing the OLS ATE. This caveat
should be borne in mind also when observing the IV estimates.
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statistically significant; however, as in the Data and Descriptive Statistics sec-
tion, the coefficient of the interaction term is negative and significant.
In the rest of the Table A.2, we provide estimates of a random-effect
Tobit model. In this case, an individual-specific random intercept ai is
added to Equation (1) and is assumed to be normally distributed (with zero
mean and variance sa) and uncorrelated with the other explanatory vari-
ables. Hence, this model produces consistent estimates only under the
rather strong assumption that the ai are uncorrelated with union status.
This finding is the main reason that led us to prefer the linear FE model in
the main text, as in that case the ai are allowed to be freely correlated with
union status. The magnitudes of the estimated coefficients in the random-
effect Tobit are very similar to those discussed earlier for the pooled Tobit,
Table A.1. Additional IV Results
Specification
IV models
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Volatility 0.165*** 0.167*** 0.129*** 0.126*** 0.212***
(s.e.) 0.030 0.030 0.033 0.034 0.050
Union 0.067** 0.067** 0.073** 0.066** 0.080**
(s.e.) 0.033 0.034 0.035 0.033 0.040
Volatility*Union –0.225*** –0.219*** –0.215*** –0.217*** –0.230***
(s.e.) 0.075 0.075 0.076 0.074 0.098
Constant term 0.648*** 0.651*** 0.817*** 0.746*** 0. 056***
(s.e.) 0.123 0.122 0.128 0.127 0.172
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Additional
controls
As in column (8)
of Table 2, plus
firm materials
in 2005
As in (1) plus
firm materials
in 2005
and 2007
As in (2) plus
industry mean
materials in
2005 and
20074
As in (3)
(see text for
list of
instruments)
As in (3) but
with sector
instead of CCNL
dummies (see text
for list of
instruments)
Instrument list1 Z3 Z3 Z3 Z4 Z5
Weak identification
test2
66.56 66.76 70.45 62.01 61.21
Sargan statistic3 0.101 0.143 0.327 0.380 0.380
p value 0.750 0.705 0.567 0.537 0.537
Observations 2,921 2,921 2,921 2,921 2,410
Notes: Coefficient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. IV, instrumental variable; s.e., standard
error.
1The instruments in list Z3 are the two-year lagged mean union status, the interaction (two-year mean
lagged union)*volatility, and the four-year lagged industry profits per worker (at the three-digit industry
codes). The instruments in list Z4 are as in Z3, but we use a six-year (instead of a four-year) lagged
industry profits per worker (at the three-digit industry codes). The instruments in list Z5 are as in Z3,
but we use a six-year lagged firm-level (instead of industry-level) profits per worker. Standard errors
clustered at the three-digit industry level.
2Kleinbergen-Paap Wald F statistic.
3Over-identification test of all instruments.
4At three-digit industry and region. Materials (firm or industry level) are in logarithms.
*, **, *** stand for statistical significance at 10%, 5%, and 1%, respectively.
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suggesting that unobserved firm heterogeneity is a relatively minor concern
in this application.
Table A.2 also displays the estimates of other control variables that could
affect the use of fixed-term contracts: the log of value added, firm-size dum-
mies, sectoral specialization, geographical location, and workforce composi-
tion. What emerges is that firm productivity (measured by the log of value
added) is the only variable that is negatively correlated with the use of
fixed-term contracts. By contrast, firm size, the share of female workers, and
the share of low-qualified workers (the omitted variable is constituted by
executives) are positively associated with the use of total fixed-term con-
tracts. The share of fixed-term contracts is also greater if firms are localized
in North-East and Central regions. We do not include coefficients for indus-
try dummies in the table for the sake of space.
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